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We analyze the role of relative performance evaluation when a prin-
cipal has several agents, who face correlated shocks. If limited liability
constraints are binding, relative performance evaluation may be of no
value if the principal is restricted to symmetric contracts. However,
with asymmetric contracts, where agents are induced to choose diﬀer-
ent eﬀort levels, relative performance measures can be used in order
to reduce informational rents. Relative performance evaluation is a
way of reducing the rents of the high eﬀort agent, who will in general
be worse oﬀ than the low eﬀort agent.
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11 Introduction
Let us begin with an empirical puzzle — why are relative performance mea-
sures are used so infrequently in agrarian contracts? There is a large lit-
erature on the nature of contracts between landlords and tenant, but this
literature suggests that rental obligations are conditioned only on the output
of the tenant, and only infrequently, and in exceptional circumstances, upon
output realizations of other tenants in the village. The empirical evidence
also suggests that output shocks are, to some extent, common across farmers
in contiguous locations. The standard model of contracting under moral haz-
ard (e.g. Holmstrom, 1979) suggests that relative performance measures can
provide more powerful incentives and greater insurance to tenant farmers.
Thus the absence of relative performance measures is a puzzle.
One response to this puzzle is to say that shocks are idiosyncratic and
independent across agents. However, if the production technology is charac-
terized by constant returns to scale, I claim that one can always partition
plots of land among tenants so that shocks are highly correlated. Take the
standard model of moral hazard. Assume that expected output is homoge-
neous of degree one in land, K, and in eﬀort e (which is the same as aggregate
labour input). Let the plot of land be of unit size. Output is random and
takes values in the set {H,L}, where the probability of H being realized is
given by p(e), which is an increasing function of e, the agent’s eﬀort. Suppose
now that the plot of land is divisible, into N parts, where the eﬀort on each
part is e/N. Consider ﬁrst the possibility that the risks on these N plots are
independent. If the outcomes are binary, on each of these N parts, then this
implies that the aggregate output is the sum of these random variables on
the component parts. As the number of parts, N, tends to inﬁnity, we deduce
that aggregate output must be deterministic, by the law of large numbers.
Hence a model where output is random at the level of the aggregate plot is
inconsistent with independent risks. Indeed, this argument shows that the
only risk must be aggregate.
Suppose now that risk is aggregate, and suppose also that there are sev-
eral landlords and several tenants in the village. The question then is, why
does not each landlord not divide up his land between two tenants or more
tenants? By doing so, he could use relative performance measures, i.e. he
could condition the payments one tenant receives also on the realized out-
come of the other tenant. Hence we are back at our initial puzzle, i.e. why
are such arrangements not common?
2In this paper, we evaluate the role of relative performance measures in
a situation of limited liability. Limited liability is a plausible assumption in
poor countries, and models of contracting with limited liability have been
increasingly used in the development economics literature — see, for exam-
ple, Banerjee and Newman (1993) or Mookherjee and Ray (2002). We ﬁnd
that the role of relative performance measures is qualitatively diﬀerent when
agents have limited liability, in contrast with their role under unlimited lia-
bility. if a principal must oﬀer the same contract to both agents (the case
of symmetric contracts), then limited liability constraints can make relative
performance evaluation valueless. On the other hand, if the principal seeks to
implement diﬀerent eﬀort levels for two agents (or if two diﬀerent principals
induce diﬀerent eﬀort levels, (the case of asymmetric contracts), then rela-
tive performance is valuable in providing incentives for the high eﬀort agent.
Intuitively, relative performance evaluation reduces the amount of rent that
the principal has to provide for the high eﬀort agent. Since the high eﬀort
agent may consequently be worse oﬀ than the low eﬀort agent, considerations
of equity plus limited liability may provide one explanation for the absence
of relative performance measures in practice.
2 The Model: Symmetric Contracts
I consider a model with one risk neutral principal who owns two plots of
land, each of size one, who contracts with two identical agents (alternatively,
the model can also be interpreted as one with two agents, who work for two
identical principals). The agent must choose eﬀort e ∈ [0,1], where the cost of
eﬀort is d(e), where d is increasing, diﬀerentiable and convex. This gives rise
to a realization of output y ∈ {H,L}. Assume that the shocks are perfectly
correlated. Speciﬁcally, the probability distribution on outputs conditional
on e =(q,p) (i.e. when the row agent chooses eﬀort q and the column agent
chooses eﬀort p, q ≤ p, is given by:
H L
H q 0
L p − q 1 − p
A contract for an agent consists of a four-tuple w = (wHH,wHL,wLH,wLL).
Assume that the agent’s utility is given by the expectation of u(w) minus
the cost of eﬀort, where u is strictly concave.
3Suppose the principal wants to implement the eﬀort level e for agent i,
given that agent j chooses eﬀort level ¯ e. Consider ﬁrst the case where e ≤ ¯ e —
this subsumes the case of a symmetric equilibrum where both agents choose
the same eﬀort level. The payoﬀ for agent i from choosing eﬀort level e0 ≤ ¯ e
is given by
e
0u(wHH) + (¯ e − e
0)u(wLH) + (1 − ¯ e)u(wLL) − d(e
0) (1)
This gives rise to an incentive compatibility constraint
u(wHH) − u(wLH) ≥ d
0(e) (IC)
where IC must hold with equality if e < ¯ e. There is also an “upward”
incentive constraint, which requires that the agent does not choose an eﬀort
level greater than ¯ e, but it is easily satisﬁed provided that the principal
chooses wHL ≤ wLL, since eﬀort is costly.
The participation constraint for an agent is given by
eu(wHH) + (1 − e)u(wLL) − d(e) ≥ ¯ u (PC)
where ¯ u denotes the utility of the agent’s outside option. Finally, we have
the limited liability constraints, w ≥ 0.
Since the principal is risk neutral, his problem is to minimize expected
wage payments subject to the constraints IC, PC and the limited liability
constraint. Expected wage payments are given by
ewHH + (1 − e)wLL (EW)
As we have already noted, wHL enters only the incentive constraint in
the upward direction and does not enter either the objective nor the other
constraints, and hence may be set arbitrarily to any number less than wLL.
Furthermore, since wLH does not enter the participation constraint, it is clear
that it it optimal to set it to zero, since that relaxes the incentive constraint
IC maximally.
Let w∗
HH be the value of the wage which solves u(w∗
HH) = d0(e). If wHH ≥
w∗
HH, then IC will be satisﬁed. Let w∗
LL be the value fo the wage which solves








HH], then the optimal contract involves setting wHH =
w∗
HH,wLL = w∗
LL (recall that wLH = 0 and wHL can also be set to zero). In
4this case, IC and PC both bind. Since wLL 6= wLH, one has relative per-




HH, the optimal contract has wHH = wLL = ¯ w, where
¯ w = u−1(¯ u+d(e)). Again one has relative performance evaluation, and in this
case the principal perfectly insures the agent since the incentive constraint
IC does not bind.
c) If w∗
LL ≤ 0, then the optimal contract has wHH = w∗
HH,wLL = 0, since
a negative value would violate the limited liability constraint. Since wLL =
wLH, there is no relative performance evaluation in the optimal contract.
Proposition 1 Let e ≤ ¯ e. Suppose that the agent receives rents in the single
agent case at eﬀort level e. Then there is no relative performance evaluation
for this agent in the two agent case, i.e. wLH = wLL
wLH must be set to zero (from IC)
wLL aﬀects PC but not IC
If PC is not binding and wLL > 0, principal can reduce wLL.
Conversely, if the agent gets no rent and limited liability constraints are
not binding, then there must be relative performance evaluation.
To summarize, we ﬁnd that a relative performance measure is used if and
only if the agent receives no rents from the relationship, i.e. if the partici-
pation constraint binds. If PC does not bind and the agent receives positive
rents, the principal does not beneﬁt from conditioning the payment to agent
i upon the output realization of the other agent, j. It is true that relative
performance is informative in this case. Indeed, the principal can insure the
agent perfectly without aﬀecting incentives by setting wLH = 0,wLL = w∗
HH.
However, this only raises the expected payments of the principal without
providing any beneﬁt, and hence is not optimal from the principal’s point of
view.
2.1 The Value of Information
Our analysis of relative performance evaluation is related to the value of
information to the principal in the context of limited liability. Consider the
situation where the agent chooses eﬀort e or e0, e0 < e, and this induces the
following probability distribution on the set of signals {H,L,L0}.
5H L L0
e e 1 − e 0
e0 e0 1 − e e0
Assume that principal’s information partition is such that he costlessly
observes whether the event H or the event {L,L0} occurs. Furthermore,
in the event that {L,L0} materializes, he can ﬁnd out which of these two
signal was realized, by incurring a small cost (possibly zero). The question
is, under what conditions does the principal have an incentive to acquire this
additional information.
If the agent has unlimited liability and is risk averse, the principal will
have a strong incentive to acquire this additional information, and the con-
tract will hence be contingent on the most ﬁnest information partition, pro-
vided that the cost of information acquisition is suﬃciently small. Indeed,
in this case, by acquiring this information the principal can ensure the ﬁrst
best — he can fully insure the agent, while providing suﬃcient incentives for
eﬀort. However, if limited liability constraints are binding, additional infor-
mation may be valueless. If the principal cannot reduce the wage payments
when L0 materializes below some lower bound, say 0, then it may be optimal
to oﬀer 0 after both L and L0, while providing incentives through a high wage
in the event of H. In this case, additonal information is valueless.
3 Asymmetric Contracts
We now consider the more general possibility, where the two agents can be
oﬀered diﬀerent contracts. Suppose that agent j is choosing eﬀort level ¯ e, and
suppose that the principal seeks to induce eﬀort level e∗ > ¯ e for agent i. We
now show that relative performance evaluation can be eﬀective in providing
incentives at low cost, for eﬀort levels which are relatively high. The reason
for this is that the marginal return to eﬀort for the agent is wHL − wLL,
(rather than wHH − wLH, as in the previous case). The ﬁrst order condition
for an optimum is
u(wHL) − u(wLL) = d
0(e
∗) (LIC)
In addition, if wHH < wHL, the ﬁrst order condition is not suﬃcient, since
a global incentive constraint must be satisﬁed. Let ˆ e be the eﬀort level which
6solves
u(wHH) − u(wLH) = d
0(ˆ e) (2)
Global optimality of e∗ requires that
(¯ e−ˆ e)[u(wHH)−u(wLH)]+(e
∗−¯ e)[u(wHL)−u(wLL)] ≥ d(e
∗)−d(ˆ e) (GIC)
The participation constraint is
¯ eu(wHH) + (e
∗ − ¯ e)u(wHL) + (1 − ¯ e)u(wLL) − d(e) ≥ ¯ u (PC’)
Hence the principal seeks to minimize expected wage payments, as given
by
¯ ewHH + (e
∗ − ¯ e)wHL + (1 − ¯ e)wLL (3)
subject to the local incentive constraint LIC, the global incentive con-
straint GIC, the participation constraint PC’, and the limited liability con-
straints.
We now show that the cost of eﬀort to the principal is kinked at e = ¯ e,
with a right hand derivative which is strictly below the left hand derivative.
Note that at e ≤ ¯ e, the cost of eﬀort is given by the participation constraint
and limited liability constraints as:
C(e) = ewHH = ev[d
0(e)] (4)
where v(.) is the inverse of the agent’s utility function u(.). Furthermore,
we also have that wLL = wLH = 0, with wHL set arbitrarily at some value
less than wHH.
C





Suppose now that the principal seeks to implement an eﬀort level e∗ which
is slightly greater than ¯ e. Note ﬁrst that the principal can do this by changing
wHL alone so that u(wHL) = d0(e∗), while leaving all other contingent wage
payments unaltered. In particular, wHH need not change. Hence the cost of
implementing e∗ must be less than the cost of following this scheme, i.e.
C(e
∗) ≤ ¯ ev[d
0(¯ e)] + (e
∗ − ¯ e)v[d
0(e
∗)] (6)
7Indeed the principal can do strictly better. Notice that the global incen-
tive constraint holds as a strict inequality under the above contract, as does
the participation constraint. Therefore the can principal reduce wHH as well
until GIC bites. I.e. he chooses wHH to solve
(¯ e − ˆ e)u(wHH) + d(ˆ e) + d
0(e
∗)(e
∗ − ¯ e) − d(e
∗) = 0 (7)
Intuitively, by choosing wHL = d0(e∗), the principal pays a marginal in-
formational rent which equals the diﬀerence between d0(e∗)(e∗ − ¯ e) and the
cost of the additional eﬀort, d(e∗) − d(¯ e). Since the cost of eﬀort function is
convex, this diﬀerence is strictly positive. This marginal informational rent
can be used to reduce the payments on previous eﬀort levels, i.e. wHH can
be chosen to be less than d0(¯ e).
C
0(e, ¯ e) = v(d
0(e)) + d






(¯ e − ˆ e)u0(wH:L)
)
(8)
Note that ﬁrst that the marginal cost of eﬀort is negative for e suﬃciently
close to (but greater than) ¯ e. To verify this, note that the negative term within
curly brackets in the above expression tends to ∞ as e & ¯ e, since this implies
ˆ e % ¯ e. Hence the cost of eﬀort declines as eﬀort is expanded beyond ¯ e, while
the marginal beneﬁt to eﬀort, which is yH − yL, is constant . It follows that
it can never be optimal for a principal to choose to implement ¯ e if the other
principal implements ¯ e. Hence there cannot exist a symmetric equilibrium
where the same eﬀort level is implemented by both principals. In the single
principal case, it will never be optimal to oﬀer a symmetric contract.
Second, note that the term in curly brackets will be negative for any e > ¯ e
provided that the agent is not too risk averse. Hence the marginal cost of
eﬀort will be lower than v(d0(e)). If the agent is risk neutral, so that v is the
identity function, the marginal cost of eﬀort reduces to
C
0(e, ¯ e) = d
0(e) − d
00(e)(e − ¯ e)
ˆ e
(¯ e − ˆ e)
(9)
On the other hand, marginal cost of eﬀort in the ﬁrst best case (where
eﬀort is veriﬁable) equals v0(d(e) + ¯ u)d0(e), which reduces to d0(e) when the
agent is risk neutral. Hence we ﬁnd that the marginal cost of eﬀort is lower
with relative performance evaluation as compared to the ﬁrst best, and there
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Shaded area: rents for b e, e∗ Area ABC = Area CDF .
Figure 1: Rents and Eﬀort
9Some intuition for our results comes from Figure 1, where both the disu-
tility of eﬀort and the utility of the wage are plotted on the vertical axis, with
eﬀort on the horizontal axis. Suppose that the agent’s outside option ¯ u is
suﬃciently low that the participation constraint is irrelevant, while limited
liability constraints bite, so that wLH = wLL = 0. In order to induce any
eﬀort level less than ¯ e, for example ˆ e, the principal must set u(wHH) equal
to the marginal cost of eﬀort at ˆ e. Whereas the cost to the agent of this
eﬀort level is given by the area under the marginal cost curve, i.e. the area
of the triangle, the beneﬁt is given by the rectangle with sides u(wHH) and ˆ e.
In consequence the agent earns an informational rent which is given by the
area of the same rectangle above the marginal cost curve (minus the outside
option ¯ u). As long as e ≤ ¯ e, the rent that the principal must pay increases
with the eﬀort level e.
Now considering inducing an eﬀort level e∗ > ¯ e. The principal must pay
u(wHL) = d0(e∗) so that this eﬀort level is locally incentive compatible. How-
ever, this implies that the agent earns a rent on eﬀort levels above ¯ e : whereas
the additional beneﬁt equals u(wHL)(e∗−¯ e), the additional cost to the agent
is d(e∗) − d(¯ e). This additonal information rent is indicated by the shaded
area. However, the principal can now reduce u(wHH) below d0(¯ e), to d0(ˆ e).
The agent makes negative rents on additional eﬀort levels in the range [ˆ e, ¯ e],
and ˆ e is chosen so that the value of these negative rents equal the positive
rents on eﬀort levels in the range [¯ e,e∗]. Hence the total informational rent
earned by the agent at e∗ is the same as that she earns at ˆ e. Since ˆ e is decreas-
ing in e∗, the informational rents earned by the agent decline with additional
eﬀort.
We conclude therefore that the principal will oﬀer diﬀerent contracts to
the two identical agents. One of the agents will be given incentives to produce
a relatively low level of eﬀort, while the other agent will be made to choose
high eﬀort. It is of interest to note that the hard working agent will be worse
oﬀ, i.e. her level of surplus will be lower than that of the agent who is made
to choose low eﬀort.
4 Conclusions
We conclude that limited liability plus the restriction to symmetric contracts
oﬀers one explanation for the absence of relative performance evaluation in
10agrarian contracts. Limited liability also explains why there is no informa-
tional advantage to a landlord from dividing up his plots between several
tenants. If asymmetric contracts are permitted, then we see that they will
be oﬀered, and this is one reason for inequality between agents to increase
for endogenous reasons.
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